Abstract. Can one extend crisp Peano arithmetic PA by a possibly manyvalued predicate Tr(x) saying \x is true" and satisfying the \dequotation schema" ' Tr(') for all sentences '? This problem is investigated in the frame of Lukasiewicz in nitely valued logic.
Introduction
It is well known that the extension PATr of Peano arithmetic by a unary truth predicate Tr(x) and the axiom schema ' Tr(') for each sentence ' is inconsistent in the frame of classical (boolean) predicate logic: G odel's diagonal lemma gives the liar's formula such that PATr` :Tr( ) and therefore PATr` : which is inconsistent in classical logic. (see 7] for metamathematics of arithmetic.)
In 6], H ajek posed the question what happens if we keep arithmetic crisp (two-valued) but allow Tr to be fuzzy (many-valued). in this case : need not be contradictory if the truth value of is 1 2 (and the logic is Lukasiewicz). Note that a similar problem was investigated by Skolem 11] . He investigated set theory with the full comprehension schema in Lukasiewicz predicate logic L8. Zadeh in 13] investigated the liar paradox in the frame of possibility theory and also showed that the liar's formula must have truth-value 1 2 . (His investigation was not related to arithmetic).
Here we shall present a theory PATr L under L8 expressing the above and show that the standard model N has no many-valued extension to a model of PATr L, nevertheless, PATr L is consistent and has nonstandard models (with crisp arithmetical part and Tr having truth values in the real interval 0; 1]); but if we add axioms saying that Tr commutes with connectives then the resulting theory PATr L 0 is inconsistent. These results are obtained in Section 2. The rest of the present section contains preliminaries; Section 3 contains some discussion and conclusions.
L8 may be presented as having the truth set 0; 1] (1 being \absolute truth", 0 \absolute falsity") and, initially, L8 may be presented as having the truth set 0; 1] (1 being \absolute truth", 0 \absolute falsity") and the connectives !, : with truth functions ), (?) where (?)x = 1 ? x; x ) y = min(1; 1 ? x + y): From these we de ne two conjunctions^; & and two disjunctions _; _, with the respective truth functions min(x; y), max(0; x + y ? 1), max(x; y), min(x + y; 1). The propositional part is completely axiomatized by four famous axioms of Lukasiewicz
together with the deduction rule modus ponens (completeness proofs by Rose-Rosser and Chang).
The corresponding predicate calculus, L8, (with predicates, object constants, object variables, connectives and quanti ers) has the natural Tarskian semantics M = hM; (r P ) P predicate ; ( De nition. Tertium non datur for a predicate P of arity n is the formula (8x 1 ; : : :; x n )(P(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) _ :P(x 1 ; : : :; x n )).
Lemma. If T is a theory and T proves tertium non datur for P 1 ; : : :; P n then for each model M of T, for each evaluation v and each formula ' built from P 1 ; : : :; P n , k'k M;v = 0 or 1. In other words, ' is crisp in each model of T. (The proof is straightforward.)
De nitions. (1) In this paper, PA stands for Peano arithmetic as formulated in Boolean logic without function symbols, i.e. using binary predicates S(x; y); x = y, ternary predicates A(x; y; z); B(x; y; z) (for successor, equality, addition and multiplication respectively and constants k for each natural k (numerals). (In boolean logic this is equivalent to the induction axiom schema, but in many-valued logic this equivalence fails, indeed, one can easily show that the induction axiom schema is not even sound in the many-valued case.) (2) PA L is a theory over RPL8 with the same language as PA, with the same deduction rules and with axioms of PA plus tertium non datur for =; S; A; B. Proof. We just carry over the proof of diagonal lemma in PA, observing that the whole syntax (formalized in PA L) is crisp. For the sake of brevity we shall informally use function symbols for crisp functions; in particular, we shall use _ !; _ _ etc. for the formalized connectives, _
x for the formalized x-th numeral etc. Then the usual proof works in PA LTr, namely let (x) be (x( _ x)) (i.e. (Subst(x; _ x)), applied to the result of formally substituting the x-th numeral for the rst free variable of the formula x), and let ' be ( ). Then PA LTr`' ( ) ( ( )) (').
De nitions. (1) Let 0 ' be 0, 1 ' = ', for n 2 let n ' be '_ : : :_' (n copies). Let _ be the corresponding arithmetization; i.e. PA LTr`(8x; y)((x + 1) _ y = y _ _(x _ y)). Note that it follows from these that Tr also commutes with other connectives, in particular Tr(x _ _y) (Tr(x)_Tr(y)):
Note also that instances of these axioms given by concrete '; substituted for x; y are consequences of dequotation. Note that we have made no use of rational truth constants; thus we could have de ned our theories as based on the (incomplete) axiomatic system L8 of Lukasiewicz predicate logic (just omit truth constants and axioms about them; 0 may stand for '&:' for an arbitrary '). This would give a slightly stronger version of Theorem 3.
Conclusion
We have shown that the question of the existence of a truth predicate for arithmetic satisfying dequotation is meaningful in the frame of Lukasiewicz(-Pavelka) many-valued predicate logic and have given three answers, two negative and one positive (Theorems 1 -3 above). Is this a mere curiosity? Or do the results have any meaning for fuzzy logic in the narrow sense, i.e. as a deductive system for vague propositions, a logic with a comparative notion of truth? It appears that on the one side, our results may disqualify some broadly shared opinions that fuzzy logic removes all paradoxes met in boolean logic: we cannot have any natural truth predicate for arithmetic (with full dequotation) ever in fuzzy logic. (If you call this a paradox or not is a matter of taste.) On the other hand, our results appear to document the fact that fuzzy logic, taken seriously, is not just applied logic but may well be considered a branch of philosophical logic (since it o ers a rich formal model of consequence under vagueness) as well as of mathematical logic (since it brings problems demanding non-trivial mathematical solutions).
